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## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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SUBJECT : Position of the "Administration" Concerning the Location of the Proposed New CIA Headquarters Building.

REFERENCE: Eyes Only Memo dtd 10 Jun 55 to Mr. Dulles Regarding Telephone Conversation with General Bragdon.

1. As a result of my discussions with Mr. Dulles concerning the referenced memorandum of conversation with General Bragdon, he telephoned Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President, and a meeting was arranged at the White House for 12:00 Noon on 14 June 1955 for the specific purpose of firming up the position of the "Administration" on the location of the proposed new CIA headquarters building. Those in attendance were: Governor Adams (for a part of the meeting), Colonel Goodpasture, Staff Secretary at the White House, Dr. Flemming, Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, General Bragdon, Special Advisor to the President on Construction, Mr. Belcher, Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, Mr. Dulles, and me.

2. Colonel Goodpasture reviewed the substance of the meeting which Mr. Dulles and I had with the President on 7 May 1955 to discuss this subject. Briefly, he stated that (1) the President had indicated that we should not locate within the City of Washington, but, at the same time, pointed out that we need not necessarily comply with current dispersion standards, and (2) that he wanted us to get on the outskirts of the City, as far out as we thought we could without hampering our activities, and believed that in view of the fact that our Relocation Center was at [REDACTED], we should be located in that general direction. He went on to state that the President had related his experiences during the war and felt strongly that it was not essential for the Director of Central Intelligence to be in the highly congested area of the District. Insofar as the possible selection of the Langley or Winkler properties was concerned, he indicated that the President had made no hard and fast decision in this matter but had stated that either of these sites would be acceptable to him. 25X1A6b

3. The second point centered around the question of whether or not permitting CIA to locate at either the Langley or Winkler locations would set a precedent and thereby make it difficult to require other agencies to comply with ODM standards. Dr. Flemming spoke up and said that he had considered this matter both with Mr. Dulles and the Cabinet and had reached the con-

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clusion that there were significant and sufficient reasons for making an exception in this instance. He emphasized that this exception should not be regarded as a precedent for other Government agencies, that CIA had acted properly in processing its request, and that other agencies desiring to do so could submit similar actions which would be considered on their individual merits.

4. General Bragdon made a strong pitch to have us moved further out and attempted to influence Dr. Flemming in his position. However, Dr. Flemming held a firm position and said that what he would like to get out of this would be the construction...if necessary...of, possibly, austere facilities at [ ] at which we would locate some of our people and give them an intensive training program so that in the event that the CIA headquarters were completely wiped out they would know how to carry on. We discussed this a bit and I indicated that we already had people there and probably had room for more...perhaps as many as 1,000 or 1,500...but that these would not be the people who would normally succeed in the chain of command. At any rate, we assured Dr. Flemming that we would study this matter and Mr. Dulles said, in effect, that we would do something along these lines. (This, I regard as almost a positive commitment to Dr. Flemming.) 125X1A6b

5. The next question was how to handle this with the Congress. Mr. Dulles advised the group that Chairman Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee had suggested that we might obtain the approval of his Committee and that of Senator Stennis', the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Real Estate and Military Construction, concerning the location we finally chose. I pointed out that a good argument against this should be that since we were required by law to consult with the National Capital Planning Commission and the National Capital Regional Planning Council it seemed unnecessary to obtain the specific approval of Congress, and stated that if this were required the location itself might get to be a political football. It was unanimously agreed that we would resist any attempt by the Congress to pick the site.

6. We discussed briefly the use of "prior year" funds. Mr. Belcher remained silent during this discussion. I assured him that we were not advocating this but had merely pointed out that it was possible and would avoid a new appropriation.

7. At the conclusion of the discussion, Governor Adams turned to Colonel Goodpasture and asked him if he felt the President would approve of either the Winkler or Langley properties. Colonel Goodpasture assured him that the President would, and Governor Adams then said, "O.K., let's go ahead."

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(Support)

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